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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does this court have jurisdiction of this matter 
due to Defendant's untimely appeal? 
2. Is there sufficient evidencie to affirm the trial 
court's finding that Defendant violated the law by not 
maintaining a proper lookout? 
3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in 
requiring Defendant to pay $100.00 in (restitution? 
STATEMENT OF FApTS 
On December 9, 1986, Defendant'|s vehicle and a 
vehicle driven by Mrs. Janice Bailey cbllided at 
approximately 11050 South 1000 East, Skndv, Utah. (T. at 
5-7.) Defendant was pulling out from |a driveway at Alta 
High School. (T. at 6.) Mrs. Bailey Was northbound on 1000 
East, (T. at 7.), traveling at 25 to 3^ ) miles per hour. (T. 
at 14.) The Defendant pulled out into Mrs. Bailey's travel 
lane and caused the front end of his vehicle to collide with 
the right side of Mrs. Bailey's vehicle. (T. at 7 and 13.) 
After the collision occurred, the two parties brought their 
vehicles to a stop, exited the vehicles and conversed with 
each other. While conversing, the Defendant repeatedly 
apologized to Mrs. Bailey for the collision. (T. at 15.) 
Officer Gordon Sadler of the Sandy City Police 
Department was dispatched to the scene of the accident at 
about 4:10 p.m. (T. at 5.) Based upon his investigation, 
Officer Sadler formed the opinion that Mrs. Bailey was in 
the process of pulling over to the curb when the collision 
occurred. (T. at 7.) However, Officer Sadler also 
determined that the point of impact was past the white 
emergency line into Mrs. Bailey's travel lane. (T. at 7.) 
While at the scene, the defendant told Officer Sadler that a 
truck was going northbound on 1000 East, that he intended to 
pull out and go northbound also, that the truck then 
proceeded to turn into the driveway, and that after the 
truck turned, Mrs. Bailey's vehicle also came northbound 
when the collision occurred. (T. at 7.) However, a few 
days later the Defendant came to the Sandy City police 
station with his mother to talk to Officer Sadler. This 
time the Defendant gave a different story. The Defendant 
said the truck was going southbound, that he intended to 
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turn and go south into the driveway, that he proceeded to 
pull out into the street as the truck turned, and after the 
truck turned the collision occurred. (T. at 8,9.) While at 
the scene of the collision Officer Sadler asked to see the 
Defendant's drivers license. The Defendant was unable to 
produce a license. (T. at 7,8.) 
At the trial Mrs. Bailey testified that she was 
intending to pull over to the curb to pick up her son from 
school, but not at the location where the collision 
occurred. She was going to pull over further down the 
street (T. at 14, 16.) Mrs. Bailey testified that she could 
see the Defendant's vehicle pulling oiit into her lane before 
the collision occurred. (T. at 13.) The Defendant admitted 
at the scene to Officer Sadler that he did not ever see Mrs. 
Bailey's vehicle before the collision. (T. at 8.) At 
trial, the Defendant admitted that the truck blocked his 
vision down the street, and that he cobld not see past the 
truck to determine if he could pull out safely. (T. at 21). 
Defendant also admitted that in spite of the truck blocking 
his line of vision down the street he pulled out into the 
street. (T. at 24.) 
After the introduction of evidehce. the Hon. Judge 
Phillip K. Palmer stated that the law {provides that whenever 
a person is emerging from a driveway, he has a duty to yield 
to all vehicles who present an immediate hazard. (T. at 
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24.) Judge Palmer then stated he believed the most credible 
evidence was that the Defendant was out in the roadway, and 
that Mrs. Bailey had not changed her course of travel. (T. 
at 25.) Judge Palmer also determined that the Defendant 
failed to yield to a vehicle that was lawfully on the 
through highway. (T. at 25.) Based upon these factual 
findings, Judge Palmer concluded that the Defendant violated 
the law by failing to maintain a proper lookout. (T. at 25.) 
Judge Palmer proceeded to sentence the Defendant. 
(T. at 25.) Judge Palmer informed the Defendant he had a 
right to appeal within 30 days. (T. at 25.) Judge Palmer 
asked the Defendant if he had a part-time job, and the 
Defendant said yes. (T. at 25,26.) Judge Palmer then 
sentenced the Defendant to pay $75.00 on the improper 
lookout charge, and $25.00 on the driving without a license 
charge, although this charge would be vacated if the 
Defendant showed proof of a license within 30 days. (T. at 
26.) Judge Palmer told the Defendant he may go. (T. at 26.) 
However, while Defendant was still present, counsel for 
Sandy City asked the Judge if he could check with Mrs. 
Bailey concerning any restitution. (T. at 26.) Judge 
Palmer asked the Defendant if he had any liability 
insurance. The Defendant stated that he did not have any. 
(T. at 27.) Mrs. Bailey stated her insurance company paid 
for the repairs, but that she was required to pay a $100.00 
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deductible. (T. at 27.) Judge Palmer tnen required the 
Defendant as part of his sentence to jf>ay $]00.00 to Mrs. 
Bailey. (T. at 27, 28.) Judge Palmed then told the 
Defendant that he may go. (T. at 28.j At no time did the 
Defendant object to the imposition of restitution. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This court should dismiss the defendant's appeal due 
to lack of jurisdiction. There is nc jurisdiction because 
of the Defendant's untimely filing ofjhis notice of appeal 
beyond the 30-day appeal period. 
There is sufficient evidence td sunnort the trial 
court's conclusion that the Defendant violated the law. 
Such facts are that Defendant admitted) to pulling out into 
the street without being able to view (oncoming traffic, the 
collision occurred in the travel lane portion of the street, 
and the Defendant admitted to not havilng se^n the other 
vehicle before the collision. 
The imposition of restitution wjas appropriate because 
all of the parties were before the coujrt: when restitution 
was discussed and the trial court askejd the Defendant 
certain questions concerning his abilijty to pay which 
included whether Defendant had liability insurance. The 
Defendant had ample opportunity to ask| questions concerning 
the restitution amount and to object, tut he at no time did 
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so and was not prejudiced in any manner by being required to 
reimburse the other driver. 
ARGUMENT I 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that an appeal is to be taken within thirty (30) 
days after entry of judgment. See, §77-35-26(d)(1), Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended). Rule 26 also provides that, 
"no appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect 
in the taking thereof, or for failure to perfect the 
appeal." §77-35-26(d)(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The Defendant has failed to perfect his appeal in 
that he failed to file his Notice of Appeal within thirty 
(30) days after the entry of judgment and sentencing. The 
trial was held, and judgment entered, on April 2, 1987, and 
the Defendant was personally notified by Judge Palmer that 
he had 30 days to appeal. Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal with this court on May 6, 1987. This was beyond the 
thirty (30) day period prescribed by Rule 26. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth in the case of 
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979), that the time 
within which an appeal must be taken is jurisdictional," and 
that the case was not properly before the court because the 
appeal was not timely. Id. at 928, 929. Therefore, this 
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court lacks jurisdiction to hear this ippeal due to the 
Defendant's untimely filing. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle 
in the case of State v. Johnson, 635 $>.2d 36 (Utah 1981), 
wherein it was held that, "the 30-da^ period for filing a 
notice of appeal . . . is jurisdictional and cannot be 
enlarged by this Court. Out-of-time Appeals must be 
dismissed." Id. at 37. 
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utali Court of Appeals also 
provides that an appeal must be taken within 30 days. 
Subsection (e) of Rule 4 provides for an extension of the 
time to appeal upon motion filed withi|n 30 days after 
expiration of the original 30-day appeal period. No such 
motion has been filed in this case. Therefore, this court 
should dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT Ii 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND 
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF IMPRpPER LOOKOUT 
The standard of review for factual findings of a 
court sitting without a jury is to give deference to the 
trial court and not overturn its findings if they are 
adequately supported by the evidence. Wessel v. Erickson 
Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Ut^h 1985). Moreover, 
the standard of review for a bench trikl is "one 
approximating the 'clearly erroneous' Standard used in 
fede ral courts." Id. (citations omitted). 
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The trial court in this matter was not clearly 
erroneous in finding that the Defendant had violated the 
law, and the judge's findings are adequately supported by 
the evidence. First, and most important, deference should 
be given to the judge, because as the finder of fact he is 
the one best able to not only hear the testimony but to 
observe the witnesses and to judge their demeanor, and 
apparent frankness or lack thereof. The judge is the one 
best able to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. In 
this case, Judge Palmer, based upon his observations, 
ascertained that the more credible evidence was that the 
Defendant's vehicle had rolled out into the travel portion 
of the through street and collided with Mrs. Bailey's 
vehicle. The unrefuted testimony by Officer Sadler was that 
the point of impact was in the travel portion of the street. 
Mrs. Bailey herself testified that she had not changed her 
course of direction. Even if the trial court found that the 
evidence showed that Mrs. Bailey was pulling over, that 
finding would not have been determinative. What is 
significant and determinative is the fact that Mrs. Bailey 
was still lawfully within her travel lane. Also of great 
importance is the Defendant's own admissions that he moved 
his vehicle out into the street at a time when his vision 
down the street was obscured by another vehicle. This 
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obviously indicates a failure to keep a proper lookout for 
other vehicles on the street. 
Concerning Judge Palmer's statement that a driver has 
a duty when emerging from a driveway to yield to all 
vehicles that may present an immediate hazard, it is 
apparent from the record that this statement was preclusory 
to his finding that the Defendant did not yield to Mrs. 
Bailey. The reasonable inference to fcfe derived therefrom is 
that Judge Palmer used this finding tcf support his 
conclusion of law that the Defendant did not maintain a 
proper lookout. In any event, this court is obligated 
pursuant to the standard of review on appeal to give 
deference to the trial court's conclusion unless there is no 
reasonable evidence to support that conclusion. 
Such other facts which support :he trial court's 
conclusion are that the Defendant came out into the street 
without stopping, the Defendant's apologetic attitude after 
the accident occurred, the Defendant's admission that he 
pulled out without being able to see bevond the truck, the 
Defendant's admission that he did not bee Mrs. Bailey's 
vehicle before the collision, and the jfact that the 
Defendant changed his story after a fe|r days. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY 
REQUIRED TO PAY RESTITUTION 
Counsel for Plaintiff concedes that pursuant to 
§76-3-201(3)(a)(i), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), the 
trial court is required to make the reasons for restitution 
a part of the record. Counsel for Plaintiff also concedes 
that Judge Palmer did not make his reasons a part of the 
record. However, of significance is whether this error 
constituted prejudicial error. The Utah Supreme Court set 
forth in the case of State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 
1985), that: 
In the case before us, there is ample 
record evidence from which the trial 
court could have found that restitution 
was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of 
the statute that the trial court's reasons 
be included as part of its order, we believe 
that the failure to do so in this case was 
harmless error. 
Id. at 614. Thus, there must be a showing of prejudicial 
error in order to overturn the trial court's order of 
restitution. 
The error of the trial court in not making its 
reasons for restitution a part of the record was harmless. 
The main fact supporting this conclusion is that when the 
question of restitution was raised, the Defendant was 
present and before the court at all times. It is evident 
from the record that Judge Palmer asked the Defendant 
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questions with regards to his ability to pay restitution. 
The Defendant stated that he did not Ijave liability 
insurance and that he did have a par4"-1 time job. At the 
close of the record, it is obvious th4t the Defendant was 
still before the trial court as Judge (Palmer ordered him to 
pay restitution, and the first $100 h4 paid would go to 
restitution, and after this impositiorj, Judge Palmer told 
the Defendant he may go. 
The Defendant had ample opportunity to question Mrs. 
Bailey concerning the deductible amount, to present any 
statements of his own, or to object td the imposition of 
restitution. In fact, §76-3-201(3) (c )|, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended), provides that the court s|hall hold a hearing on 
restitution if an objection is made. [However, the record is 
void of an objection or any questions Iconcerning the 
requirement of restitution. Based on |the facts that all of 
the witnesses and the Defendant were pjresent and before the 
court when restitution was considered, and that the 
defendant did not even question the parties concerning the 
amount of restitution, it is clear that it was not 
prejudicial in any way to require the ^Defendant to reimburse 
Mrs. Bailey for the amount she had to Expend because the 
Defendant did not have liability insurance. 
Counsel for appellant refers tolno judicial or 
statutory law which makes it obligator^ for an order of 
11 
restitution to be based on evidence presented by a witness, 
on the witness stand while under oath and subject to 
cross-examination. Seeing as there are no such 
requirements, Defendant's arguments to the same are without 
merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was more than 
adequate to support a conclusion that the Defendant violated 
the law by not maintaining a proper lookout. Also, it was 
proper for the court to require restitution to the other 
driver. 
More importantly, this court lacks jurisdiction 
because Defendant's appeal was untimely taken. 
Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests this 
court to dismiss Defendant's appeal, or in the alternative, 
affirm the trial court's conviction of Defendant and 
imposition of restitution. 
DATED this " 2 ^ day of July, 1987. 
Mark T. Ethington 
Sandy City Attorney's Office 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 
1987, I served four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
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Respondent upon the following, by han|d delivering copies 
addressed to William G. Fowler, J. Anbus Edwards, FOWLER & 
PURSER, 340 East Fourth South, Salt L^ke City, Utah 84111. 
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